【主题】Reward, Punishment and Children’s Cooperation Preference

【主讲人】周晔馨教授（北京师范大学经济与资源管理研究院）

【主持人】刘愿教授

【时间】2024年4月18日（周四）14:00

【地点】301会议室

【摘要】This paper presents findings from a large-scale lab-in-the-field experiment involving over 1600 students aged 7-17, examining the impacts of various institutions on children’s cooperation preferences in public goods games. Our results reveal that punishment is more effective than reward with marginal significance, and an exogenously imposed institution is significantly more effective than an endogenously chosen one. A probe into the underlying mechanism shows that rule effects, the choice of institutions, and belief about others’ contribution all play a role in determining children’s cooperation levels. Additionally, psychological loss aversion and obedience to authority could explain their differing contributions across institutions. Lastly, we demonstrate that institutions with a 50% probability of enactment could also significantly improve children’s cooperation, but the effects are weaker than that under certainty. Our study contributes to the literature on public goods games by analyzing the roles of different incentive institutions in facilitating children’s cooperation and provides cost-saving policy implications.

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