题目：Competing Openly or Blindly in Crowdsourcing Contests?

主讲人：刘潇 博士

时间：11月7日(周五)下午15：00

地点：学院301会议室
欢迎感兴趣的师生积极参与！
 

刘潇老师的简介：清华大学助理教授，密歇根大学博士。研究方向为实验经济学、行为经济学和博弈论。曾在Management Science,Games and Economic Behavior等管理学和经济学顶级期刊发表论文多篇。

摘要: Organizations are increasingly outsourcing tasks once performed in-house to wider participants on the Internet by hosting online contests. In practice, two types of mechanisms are used to organize these contests: simultaneous (blind) and sequential (open). In a simultaneous contest, contestants submit their solutions independently without access to one another's submissions, while in a sequential contest, contestants submit their solutions sequentially and each can view all prior submissions before making their decisions. Most prior theoretical and experimental research has focused on simultaneous contests, with only a handful that have studied sequential ones.  In this paper, under the condition of incomplete information, we analytically show that  simultaneous contests produce higher quality best solutions than sequential contests. Using a laboratory experiment, we test this theoretical prediction as well as the prediction that simultaneous contests are more efficient than sequential contests. Our data support both predictions. We also discover that as the number of contestants increases, the efficiency of sequential contests drops significantly, further reducing their  performance relative to simultaneous contests.