题目：Delegating Performance Evaluation

主讲人：刘烁 北京大学助理教授 

时间：2019年9月26日（周四）下午2:30

地点：文科楼三栋MBA中心415课室

作者简介：刘烁，2019年毕业于瑞士苏黎世大学经济系，获博士学位，现为北京大学光华管理学院应用经济系助理教授。目前主要研究领域为组织经济学，产业组织理论，机制设计和博弈论。研究成果发表或即将发表于国际知名学术期刊，如RAND Journal of Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Theory. 曾获奖项包括瑞士国家科学基金会博士访学奖助金 (SNSF Doc. Mobility Fellowship, 用于资助到美国哥伦比亚大学经济系访问一年)，法国外交和欧洲事务部埃菲尔奖学金 (Eiffel Scholarship)

摘要：We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance evaluation is delegated to a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal determines a set of prizes to be allocated to the agents, is optimal. By using a contest, the principal can commit to sustaining incentives despite the reviewer’s potential leniency bias. The optimal effort profile can be uniquely implemented by an all-pay auction with a cap. Our analysis has implications for applications as diverse as the design of worker compensation, the awarding of research grants, and the allocation of foreign aid.