主题：Second-order Sniping in Online Auctions

会议时间：2020年6月24日（周三） 14:30-16:00

地点：腾讯会议（会议号502 894 496；密码6699）

主讲人：曹志刚教授

摘要：Sniping is a common strategic behavior in online auctions with hard-close. It is widely believed that sniping is an unfair practice to other bidders that may also harm the auction platform, and the introduction of soft-colse largely discourages sniping. We argue, both theoretically and empirically, that soft-close cannot eliminate the advantage of sniping; and what's worse, it may cause second-order sniping, a strategic behavior that snipes the snipers. The key reason is that, proxy bidding is not allowed in many platforms and consequently many bidders are unable to be fully concentrated during the auction. We propose a level-k model to rigorously analyze this situation and show that second-order sniping emerge naturally. Using large-scale data from Alibaba Judicial Auction, an online soft-close first-price auction platform, we provide significant evidences for the existence of snipers and second-order snipers, and find that, compared with nonstrategic bidders, their winning chances are significantly higher and winning prices are significantly lower. (joint work with Yunlong Wang and Xiaoguang Yang)

主讲人介绍：曹志刚，北京交通大学经济管理学院教授。2010年毕业于中科院数学与系统科学研究院并留院任助理研究员。2017年9月加盟北京交通大学经济管理学院，任“卓越百人计划”教授。主要研究兴趣为博弈论及其应用，包括网络博弈和算法博弈论等。在相关领域主流刊物发表论文20余篇，包括Operations Research、Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Mathematical Economics, Social Choice and Welfare, International Journal of Game Theory 和Theoretical Computer Science等期刊以及ACM Economics & Computation等会议。获中国信息经济学理论贡献奖、系统科学与系统工程青年科技奖、中国决策科学青年科技奖和关肇直青年研究奖。任中国信息经济学会常务理事，中国运筹学会博弈论分会副秘书长、排序论分会副秘书长，中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会智能决策与博弈分会副理事长、青年工作委员会副秘书长、网络科学分会副秘书长等。主持包括优秀青年基金在内的国家自然科学基金委课题4项。