主题：Brand Spillover as a Marketing Strategy

时间：2021年9月23日（周四）上午10:00-11:30

腾讯会议 ID：868 115 178

会议密码：6688

主讲人：吴肖乐教授（复旦大学）

主持人：卿前恺副教授

主讲人简介：

吴肖乐，复旦大学管理学院教授、博士生导师。2006年本科毕业于清华大学工业工程系，2011年博士毕业于圣路易斯华盛顿大学。主要研究供应链管理、风险管理等。其研究工作发表于Management Science, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Production and Operations Management等管理类期刊。曾获中国管理学青年奖(2017)、华人学者管理科学与工程协会最佳论文一等奖(2011)、2016 MSOM Meritorious Service Award等。2020年获国家自然科学基金杰出青年科学基金项目资助，2016年获国家自然科学基金优秀青年科学基金项目资助。入选上海市教育系统三八红旗手（2021）、上海市教育系统巾帼建功标兵（2020）、上海市曙光人才计划（2016）。目前担任UTD期刊POM的Senior Editor、INFORMS期刊Service Science 和Modern Supply Chain Research and Applications 的Associate Editor。并担任中国管理现代化研究会风险管理专业委员会秘书长、中国管理现代化研究会运作管理专业委员会委员、中国管理现代化研究会管理与决策科学专业委员会常务理事、中国运筹学会随机服务与运作管理分会常务理事等。

摘要：

When a weak-brand firm and a strong-brand firm source from a common contract manufacturer, the weak-brand firm may advertise this relationship to promote its own product. This paper investigates whether the weak-brand firm should use such brand spillover as a marketing strategy and how this decision depends on the firms' characteristics and market conditions. We develop a game theoretic model consisting of one contract manufacturer and two firms with asymmetric brand power. The contract manufacturer determines the wholesale prices for the two firms and then each firm decides whether to source from the contract manufacturer. If both firms outsource to the contract manufacturer, then the weak-brand firm may choose whether to promote its product through brand spillover. Although brand spillover improves the attractiveness of the weak-brand firm's product at no cost, we find that the weak-brand firm should not use brand spillover if (1) its original brand power is sufficiently low or (2) the contract manufacturer does not have a significant cost advantage. Interestingly, the adoption of brand spillover by the weak-brand firm can benefit all three parties under certain circumstances, including the strong-brand firm. Nevertheless, when the contract manufacturer has a significant cost advantage, in equilibrium the strong-brand firm will be hurt by brand spillover and hence should take actions to prevent it.